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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAROLD A. CARLSON AND
M. E. HARRIS, Jll.,
Defendants .
.M. E. HARRIS, JR.,
Third-Part;IJ Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, and
ARTCOL CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

1

Case No.
11,636

NATURE OF CASE
The only action before the court is a suit by M. E.
Harris, Jr., a professional architect to foreclose a mechanic's lien for architectural services as to the landowner, Zions Securities Corporation.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
After pre-trial and trial before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, a judgment and decree was entered in favor of lH. E. Harris, Jr., against
Zions Securities Corporation foreclosing Harris' mechanic's lien.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the findings, conclusions and decree entered by the trial court.

STATEiYIENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is unsatisfactory because it is neither complete nor entirely accurate.
2

Respondent, 1\1. E. Harris, Jr., was and is a licensed architect in the State of Utah, qualified to render
professional architectural services in the state. ( R. 177)
Harris and one Harold Carlson, a licensed California
architect, were commissioned as joint venturers by Artcol Corporation to prepare complete plans and specifications for the construction of a multi-storied apartment
building on the block bounded by South Temple, First
Avenue and "A" Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R.
178 and 179) The contract called for payment of a flat
fee of $212,350.00, but in the event work should be
stopped, for 75% of that sum after the plans and specifications had been prepared. (Pl. Ex. 2) It was stipulated at the trial that if Harris should prevail, he is entitled to judgment in the sum of 75% of $212,350.00,
or $159,262.50, together with interest thereon and reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of 10% of said principal and interest. ( R. 220 and 221)
All of the work performed was under the supervision of Harris. ( R. 202) Carlson assigned to Harris
all of his right, title and interest in the contract and
mechanic's lien, subsequently filed. (Pl. Ex. 1) To pay
for the cost of preparing the plans and specifications,
Harris and Carlson borrowed $90,000.00 from Zions
First National Bank, which entire sum was expended
for employees, draftsmen, engineers, and materials and
which obligation was secured by an assignment of the
Artcol contract to Zions Bank. (Pl. Ex. 3) Over a period
of many months, Harris and Carlson prepared preliminary sketches, plans, specifications, engineering studies,

3

topographic studies, renderings, surveys, material lists,
FHA applications, zoning applications, soil tests, site
clearing and all of the things necessary to complete the
plans and specifications for the apartment building. (Pl.
Exs. 4 through 16) The FHA approved construction
of the apartment building and issued an FHA insured
commitment on the construction loan. ( R. 17 4)
Prior to Harris' employment, Zions Securities had
given Artcol an option to lease the property in question
for the purpose of building the apartment. (Pl. Ex. 20)
Zions Securities purchased the property with the
thought in mind that it would be used for a mission
home or type of building that would be useful to the
church, but thereafter abandoned that plan and gave
Artcol an option to later obtain a lease for the purpose
of developing the property with an apartment building.
(R. 207, 208 and 218) Zions Securities had owned the
property for approximately eight years prior to the
lease to Artcol and during said period it had remained
vacant, except for a home thereon which produced
$100.00 a month rental. (R. 221)
Artcol exercised the option and Zions Securities
leased the property to Artcol with the intention that the
building would be constructed. (Pl. Ex. 21) ( R. 208)
Mr. Doxey, the Manager of Zion Securities, testified,
"As I say, there was no question but what the
intent was that they were proposing and planning to build a building. That was the only interest they had in it." ( R. 208)
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The lease is entirely predicated upon the building
of the apartment. It is interesting to note that Appellant
attaches as an appendix to its brief excerpts from Exhibit 21, the lease, and omits portions which support
Respondent's position. For example, Appellant omits
paragraph 2 of the lease that requires joint appraisals
of the land and building, each year, by Zions and Artcol
for the purposes of determining rentals. Paragraph 5
is omitted and provides that the building shall become
and remain the property of Zions. Paragraph 6 is
omitted which gives Zions the building in the event of
termination of the lease and requires Artcol to deliver
the building "in as good as condition as when such building or buildings ... are completed, reasonable wear and
tear ... excepted." Paragarph 11 requiring Artcol to
keep the buildings insured against fire and other loss
for the benefit of Zions Securities is omitted.
The lease calls for a minimum of $18,000.00 a year,
increasing to $36,000.00 a year or sums in excess thereof,
based upon the appraised value of the land and the
apartment after completion. Zions received $1,000.00 at
the time of entering into the option, $54,000.00 at the
time of entering into the lease, and in excess of
$18,000.00 for rental during the period of the preparation of the plans and specifications, together with real
property taxes during said period in the sum of
$3,464.00 (Pl. Ex. 24) (R. 210-212) The lease further
regulates the use of the premises, such as prohibiting the
consumption of beer or intoxicating liquors (p. 3), requires the construction to meet architectural standards
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(p. 4), requires that the improvement should revert to
Zions at the expiration of the lease (p. 4), requires the
building to be insured for the benefit of the lessor (p.
6), requires Artcol's covenant that it will not permit
liens to be filed with respect to said building, but allows
Artcol to test the validity of liens filed (p. 8), gives
Zions a lien upon all the personal property within the
building (p. 10), authorizes Artcol to finance the building with FHA insured money (p. 13), sets up an elaborate formula among lessor, lessee and FHA in the
event of condemnation (p. 13) and provides:
"The LANDLORD agrees that, within ten
(IO) days after receipt of written request from
TEN ANT, it will join in any and all applications
for permits, licenses or other authorizations required by any governmental or other body claiming jurisdiction in connection with any work
which the TENANT may do hereunder, and
will also join in any grants for easements for electric, telephone, gas, water, sewer and such other
public utilities and facilities as may be reasonably
necessary in the operation of the demised premises or of any improvements that may be erected
thereon; and if, at the expiration of such ten ( 10)
days' period, the LANDLORD shall not have
joined in any such application, or grants for
easements, the TENANT shall have the right
to execute such application and grants in the
name of the LANDLORD, and, for that purpose, the LANDLORD hereby irrevocabl;IJ appoints the TEN ANT as its Attorney-in-fact to
e,recute such papers on behalf of the LANDLORD." (emphasis added)
6

After Harris had substantially completed the preliminary sketches, he met with the manager of Zions
Securities, l\Ir. Doxey, at the request of Artcol and discussed the preliminary sketches with him in detail and
received his approval of same. ( R. 183, 184) Mr. Doxey
of Zions Securities executed all applications for zoning
variances and either he or J.Vlr. Merrill of Zions Securities, appeared with l\Ir. Harris at zoning hearings and
enthusiastically urged the approval of Harris' plans presented to the zoning board and the construction of the
building. (PL Exs. 5 to 8) Mr. Doxey, at one zoning
hearing testified in substance as follows:
"Mr. Doxey explained his interest is secondary. This _property is not easy to develop with its
slopes and position in relation to First Avenue
and South Temple. They are happy with this
proposal, because it makes it possible for an expensive piece of land to be put into an economic
use. The fact they have added fifty percent more
off-street parking than is required is evidence of
excellent planning. He felt this project would be
a great contribution to the community. Zions
Securities Corporation is very much in favor of
this development on the basis as proposed. They
feel the very small request of change in recognizing the sidewalk instead of the property line
in this instance on a one-way street, a street of
little traffic, would not be difficult to grant from
the standpoint of variance because of the particular facts that surrounded this situation. 'Vhen
asked the terms of the lease, Mr. Doxey explained it is for fifty-five years."
"l\ir. Doxey pointed out that there has to be
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some development 011 this corner if the city is
going to grow, and the corner cannot be developed with its cost unless some substantial
building is built on it, and a substantial building
is going to increase the parking. To him it seemed
unlikely that A Street with its contours will ever
be changed to any other than a one-way street.
So the requested variance on A Street would
seem equitable. Height is something the Board
has wrestled with for a long time and it is such a
problem in the modern development of Salt Lake
City that changes have been made in the ordinance. The request came well within the change
that will be made before long. He noted that the
parking inside the building would be an asset and
also that th<i parking far exceeds that which is
required. "\Vhen the chairman asked if this is a
definite lease, Mr. Doxey stated: 'The lease is a
firm lease and the money has been paid'." (R.
214, 215)

l\fr. Doxey reaffirmed this position in letters to the
Zoning Board. (Pl. Ex. 22 and 23)

Soil tests were made on the property and the existing building was demolished and removed therefrom,
all as part of the program, and with the knowledge and
implied consent of Zions Securities. (R. 217)
The construction loan was never obtained and the
project was abandoned, primarily by reason of the death
of the principal officer of Artcol Corporation. (R. 204)
Harris was paid nothing for his services in preparing
the complete plans and specifications for the building.
( R. 204) l-larris thereupon caused to be filed with the
County Recorder, his notice of intention to claim a lien,
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(Pl. Ex. 19) and thereafter when Zions First National
Bank commenced action upon the $90,000.00 notes,
Harris, by a third party complaint, sought to foreclose
his lien against Zions Securities Corporation, and was
granted judgment on his third party complaint, from
which judgment this appeal has been taken by Zions
Securities.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES HERIN, THE LIEN OF THE ARCHITECT HARRIS ATTACHED TO THE INTEREST OF THE LESSOR, ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION.
Points 1, 2 and 4 of Appellant's brief all effectively
<leal with the issue of whether or not the lien, attached
to the interest of the lessor, Zions Securities Corporation. Respondent, therefore, will answer all three of
Appellant's points hereunder.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 38-1-3, expressly gives a lien to "licensed architects and engineers and
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service or bestowed labor."
The statute further provides that the architect
"shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning
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which they have rendered service * * * whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by
his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise."
There is no question but that an architect is entitled to a mechanic's lien, see lleadlund v. Daniels, 50
Utah 381, 167 Pac. 1170, (1917), and that the lien extends to his services in furnishing plats, plans, maps,
etc. Frehner v. Morton, 18 U.2d 422, 424 P.2d 446
(1967).
Early Utah cases suggested that a lessor's interest
was not !)Ubject to a lien with respect to improvements
contracted for by the tenant unless the relation of principal and agent existed between the lessor and lessee.
See Morrow v. Merritt, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac. 667
( 1898); Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 219, 97 Pac. Ill
( 1908). Even under the early cases, however, it was
clear that the agency could be express or implied, or by
subsequent ratification. These cases, however, construed
an earlier Utah mechanic's lien statute which contained
a provision that the lien should attach only to such interest as the owner or "lessee" may have in the real
estate. The words "or lessee" have been deleted from the
present statute.
A later case under the old statute suggests that
where the lease agreement requires that the lessee make
stipulated improvements, an agency will arise for the
purposes of making those improvements. See Gorman
v. Birrell, 41 Utah 274, 125 Pac. 685 (1912). Although
the lease per se does not require the construction of the
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apartment building, the whole purpose and intention of
the lease was in contemplation of the building of the
apartment house. The lease requires architectural standards to be conformed to in the building of the apartment
house. The rental ultimately is based upon the value of
the improvement built. The apartment house reverts to
the lessor at the end of the lease. The lease contains restrictive provisions with respect to the use of the apartment house. The lease requires insurance upon the apartment building for the benefit of the lessor. The lease
contemplates the filing of liens and requires the tenant
to save the landlord harmless therefrom. The lease gives
the landlord a lien upon the furniture and fixtures to be
placed in the apartment building. And, finally, by the
lease, the landlord agrees to join in all necessary applications for building permits, licenses, et cetera, and "for
that purpose, the landlord hereby irrevocably appoints
the tenants as its attorney-in-fact to execute such papers
011 behalf of the landlord."
In fact, it is generally accepted law in most jurisdictions that where the lease contemplates the construction of a building which will enhance the value of the
fee to the benefit of the lessor, the lessee must be deemed
the agent of the lessor for the purpose of the construction. See annotation 87 A.L.R. 1290. See Myers v.
Joseph A. Strowbridge Company, 82 Ore. 29, 160 Pac.
13.5; Oregon Lumber Company v. Nolan, 75 Ore. 69,
143 Pac. 935; Denniston Company v. Brown, 183 Iowa
3!)8, 167 N.,iV. 190; Loeff v. Myer, 284 Ill. 114, 119
N.E. 908; Long-Bell Lumber Company v. McCray
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Bank Company, 89 Kan. 788, 132 Pac. 992; English v.
Olympic Auditorium, 20 P.2d 946; Ott Hardware Company v. Yost, 69 Cal. App. 2d 593, 159 P.2d 663.
Further, the parties to the lease cannot circumvent
liens by provision of the lease. See Metals Manufacturer
Company v. The Banh of Commerce, 16 U.2d 74, 395
P.2d 914, wherein this court construing the bonding
statute to protect materialmen (U.C.A., 1953, 14-2-1
and 2), a comparable statute to the mechanic's lien statute, allowed a material supplier to recover against the
leasee even though the terms of an agreement between
the lessee and the lessor stated that the improvements
made to the building would remain personal property
and could be removed by the lessee at the end of the
lease. This court stated:
"It would seem to be unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude that such parties by agreement
among themselves could bind third party suppliers of materials to the terms of an agreement
to which such suppliers were not privies and the
terms of which they do not know. Such conclusion could result in easy circumvention of the
statute whose purpose clearly is to protect suppliers, if what they supply falls within the clear
import of the statute."

In Robert L. 1Veed Architect Inc. v. Horning, 33
So. 2nd 648 (Fla. 1948) , facts remarkably similar to the
instant case, the architect executed a contract with the
under a lease which contemplated improvements
and which contained an identical provision to the lease
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herein, whereby the lessee agreed not to allow any mechanic's liens to be placed upon the land and the land
owner contended this defeated the lien. The Florida
Court stated:
"To rebut the latter contention, it is sufficient
to say that the original lease provided for the
improvements on the lease-hold from which Appellant's lien accrued, both parties knew they
were essential to execute the purpose of the lease
and both parties knew that they were the very
gist of the lease. When the lease is read in sum
one can draw no other conclusion than that both
parties contemplated and knew that a contract
for the improvements would be made. Appellant
was not a party to the lease and since the statute
gives him a lien, it would be ridiculous to hold
that the parties to the lease can contract to defeat
the law."
The Indiana Court in American Islam Society vs.
Bob Ulrich Decorating, 132 N.E. 2d. 620 (Ind. 1956)
stated:
"Something more than mere inactive consent is
necessary in order that a lien may be acquired
against the owner of the property. But where
in
the vendor has been active and
having the improvements made, the lien will pttach to the real estate where the vendee failed to
carry out his contract of purchase. * * * The lien
may attach if the owner of the real estate has been
active and instrumental in having the improvements made. If there is such evidence then under
the well-recognized rules, this court will not
weigh the evidence and reverse the finding of the
trial court upon a disputed question of fact. * * *

13

"The lessor's interest * * * may be subject to
a mechanic's lien by reason of the lessee's coutract where the lease contemplates the makillg
of improvements by the lessee, especially where
such improvements are a substantial benefit to
the lessor, as well as where the lessee obligates
himself to make improvements at his own expense. * * *
"It is the general rule that where a lease coutains a provision authorizing the lessee to make
improvements 'by deducting the costs thereof
from the rent, or where part of the consideration
of the lease is the making by the lessee of improvements which became a part of the realty.
or that the improvements made by the lessee shall
revert to the lessor, a mechanic's lien may attach
to the property for work done or materials furnished, pursuant to a contract with the lessee'."

A number of the cases cited by Zions are from strict
construction states, such as Iowa. The most that can be
said for these cases, as well as the Utah Case of Belnap
v. Condon, supra, is that something more than mere
consent is required to subject the title of the fee owner
to the lien.
As aptly stated by the Supreme Court of l\Iissouri:
"\Vhile the lease should, if such connection
exists, sufficiently disclose the lessor's finger
prints on same, it is not upon this instrument
alone, howe,·er, but to all the facts connected
with the transaction that we mav look in determining whether a connection
the nature of
agency exists hehveen the parties and as a
quence the right of the respondents to the hens.
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Allen Estate Association v. Boeke, 300 Mo. 575,

254 S.\V. 858 (1923).

In addition to the fingerprints of the lessor on the
lease herein, the singular evidence is that the lessor actively participated in the development and improvement
of its real property and impliedly authorized and ratified
the employment of Harris, and subjected itself to Harris' architect's lien. Under the circumstances surrounding the development of Zions property, it had adequate
means to protect itself from claims of unpaid laborers
and materialmen. It sought to protect itself by requiring
Artcol to covenant that no liens would be filed against
the property, but all Zions had to do was to require Artcol to obtain a bond, saving Zions harmless from lien
claims.
"The aim and purpose of the Utah Mechanic's
Lien Law (38-1-1 - 38-1-26, U.C.A., 1953)
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards,
those who perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a
building or other improvement. The owner of the
premises is most likely to suffer." Rio Grande
Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac.
241.

POINT II
HARRIS' LIEN IS VALID THOUGH THE
APARTMENT 'VAS NOT CONSTRUCTED.
U.C.A., 1953 38-1-3, expressly provides that:
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" * * * Licensed architects and engineers and
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans,
maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence or who have rendered
other like professional service or bestowed labor
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials."
The statute does not require that a building must be
constructed before such a lien attaches. And this court
has held that the lien attaches when work or material
has commenced on a structure, or preparatory thereto.

Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 U.2d 409, 424 P.2d 437.

The Utah cases cited by Zions purporting to require the erection of a building, deal with cases where
materials are supplied but not actually used at the building site. The legislature, has expressly concluded that
an architect's services benefit the property, and the fact
of the matter is that Harris has prepared a quarter of a
million dollars worth of plans, specifications, engineering studies, soil studies, et cetera, which are tailor-made
'to the property in question and which would cost an
equal amount to reproduce for this property. In preparing these plans, Harris has expended $90,000.00 of
his own money, and while the plans were being prepared
Zions received in excess of
in rentals.
Third party defendant cites an Iowa case which
purports to hold that an architect had no lien when the
building was not erected. See Foster v. Tierney, 59
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N.,V. 56. The Iowa statute is entirely different, how-

ever, than the Utah statute in that first, an architect is
not expressly given a lien, and secondly, the liens granted du not extend to the property upon or concerning
which the service was rendered. More nearly in point is
Larnoreaux v. Andersch, 150 N.W. 908 (Minn.), where
the court held that the architect constructively contributes improvements to the land and is entitled to enforce
his lien for plans and specifications prepared. This was
so even though the Minnesota statute was the same as
the Iowa statute. The court discusses the Foster case
and points out that it is based upon a strict construction
of the Iowa statute, Iowa being a strict construction
state. Even in the Lanwreaux case, the statute did not
expressly give an architect a lien. The Lamoreaux case
also refers to Freernan v. Rinaker, 56 N.E. 1055 (Ill.),
where the Illinois court upholds a lien to one who performs services as an architect and validates the lien even
though the building is not constructed.
POINT III
THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CLAIM
A LIEN IS VALID WITHOUT REFERENCE
TO HAROLD CARLSON.
The court will recall that the architectural services
were rendered by the joint venture of Harris and Carlson and that Carlson assigned all of his interest in the
claim and the lien to Harris. U.C.A., 1953, Title 38-126, expressly provides that all liens under the mechanic's
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lien statute shall be assignable as other choses in action.
Smoot v. Checketts, 44 Utah 211, 125 Pac. 412, held
that the right to perfect a lien is also assignable.
The fact that Carlson is not named in the notice of
lien itself is indistinguishable from Buehner Block v.
Glezos, 6 U.2d 226, 310 P.2d 51'7, where the owner
charged with the lien was not named therein and the
court held this omission was immaterial.

POINT IV.
THE NOTICE OF LIEN IS VALID DESPITE TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS.
The challenge to the lien's validity by reason of a
purported lack of verification occurred for the first time
on the morning of trial. Respondent vigorously objected
to Zion's raising this issue belatedly. The answer to thG
third party complaint filed a year and a half prior to the
trial not only failed to affirmately plead this purported
defense, but, in fact, admitted that the lien was prepared
and filed by Harris, denying only that Zions was indebted to Harris by reason of any professional services
rendered to Zions. 'Vhen Harris filed a supplemental
complaint alleging the assignment from Carlson, Zions
again filed its answer admitting the preparation and filing of the notice of claim of lien by Harris and in no way
affirmatively alleging the invalidity of said notice by
reason of lack of verification. By affirmative defense,
Ziom alleged that the notice of lien was null and void
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only because (a) Carlson was not a party to same, and
(b) Zion!') Securities had not authorized the filing of
same, and (c) no benefit had been conferred upon Zions
Securities.
The notice of lien in question was dated November
16, 1965, and signed by Harris personally and acknowledged before a notary public who duly affixed his siguature and seal and thereupon was recorded in the office
of the Salt Lake County Recorder. Suit was commenced
upon the lien in June, 1966. Zions took the deposition
of Harris in August of 1966, the deposition taking several days, and at which deposition Harris, under oath,
testified as to all of the essential elements of his lien and
this cause of action. The deposition was followed by the
deposition of Yarious personnel of Zions Securities.
Zions Securities thereafter filed a motion for summary
ju<lgment, at no time raising the issue of a purported
]aek of yerification. The motion was denied. Thereafter,
the matter came on for pre-trial hearing twice before the
Third District Court, and at no time was the alleged defense of lack of verification raised.
Zions Securities has waived any purported defense
of technical insufficiency of the lien by failing to raise
same until the morning of trial. A failure to plead an
affirmative defense results in a waiver of that defense
and is excluded in the case, IA, Barron
Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 279, p. 166. (Construing Rule 8 ( c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which is identical to the Utah rule.) Rule 8 ( c), U.R.-
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C.P. provides that a pleading shall set forth affirmatively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. A general denial will not permit proof of
such matters not affirmatively alleged. The rule enumerates nineteen affirmative defenses most commonly invoked but is not limited to them. Other matters which
have been held by the courts to constitute affirmative
defenses which must be specially pleaded, for example,
include insufficiency of a claim for a tax refund. Northwestern National Bank v. U.S., 46 F. Supp. 390 (D.C.
Minn., '42), affirmed 137 F.2d 761. Clearly, the claim
that the notice of lien is insufficient constitutes an avoidance requiring special affirmative pleading.

A litigant waives any objection to want of or defects in verification by failing to plead same. 41 Am.
Jur., Pleading, Sec. 391, p. 562, Footnote 6; 71 CJS,
Pleading, Sec. 556, p. 1120.
The Supreme Court of Utah has repeatedly held
that the notice of intention to claim a lien filed under
the statute is no more nor less than simply that: A notice. See Buehner Bloc/.,: vs. Glezos, supra, wherein the
court states:
"The purpose of the recordation of the notice
of lien is to give notice thereof to all persons who
may be affected thereby. * * * A further assault
upon the lien by
Hong that it was not effective against him nor his interest in the property
because his name was not listed on the notice of
lien is without merit."
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The purpose of recording this document is to provide
notice to those persons who. may be interested in said
real property of the fact that the claimant thereunder
asserts a claim against that real property. The notice
filed herein complies not only substantially but exactly
with the statutory requirements specifying the property,
the owner, the claimant, the amount, the dates and all
else required to adequately and fully apprise the world
of the nature of Harris' claim. The one thing lacking,
which Zions now claims renders this notice ineffective
is a traditional verification. A traditional verification in
no way amplifies nor clarifies the information contained
in the body of the notice. The body of the notice is sufficient to apprise any interested person of the nature of
Harris' claim with or without the verification.
Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 31, states
that to "acknowledge" is:

" * * * to own, avow or admit; to confess; to
recognize one's acts and assume the responsibility
therefor."
Indeed, the requirement of verification is really nothing
more than an archaic link with a highly formalized approach of the past and has been rejected in almost all
legal procedure generally. The lien statute specifying
the contents of the notice of claim practically in its present form, was enacted in 1888, eight years before statehood. As stated in IA, Barron Holtzoff, ibid, § 333,
p. 270, the trend of enlightened opinion is away from the
all too barren formality of an oath to pleadings. As the

21

court is aware, the need for a wrification in formal
pleadings filed in a court of law, which go well beyond
merely the notice filed by Harris, has been abolished.

In Tangren t 1• Snyder, 10 C.:2<l 95, 368 P.:!d 711,
this court in construing the statute regarding filing
of claims in probate proceedings, l,'.C.A., 1953, 75-9-.3,
stated:
''Respondent contends that the court was correct in dismissing the action with prejudice because courts in states haYing similar statutes hare
held the requirements in the affidaYit to be mandatory and haYe strictly construed them so that
an on;ission or failure
comply exactly with the
literal wording of the statute was fatal to the
presentment and upon rejection could not be the
basis of a complaint thereon. (footnotes omitted!

"Te

"'Ye are not in accord.
are of the opinion
that the statutory requirements of the contents
of the claim and affidaYit in support thereof
should be liberalh- construed and that such statutes were, as ap't°ty stated in Cnited States Fidelity Guaranf!J Co. t·. Keck, 75 Cal. App. 2<l
828, 171P.2d731, 'not i11tended to make it easier
to aYoid payment of a just claim, but were intended to make a claimant set forth his claim with
such particularity that the executor or administrator in passing upon it would be fully adYised
as to .i us t what was claimed. * * *' "
Zions. in its memorandum. cites authority from
Kansas and X ew )fexico purporting to make mandatory
the ,-erification of a lien notiee. Kansas. howeYer. construes mechanic lien statutes as in derogation of the

eommon law and hence strictly. D. J. Fair Lumber Co.
'l'. Carlin, 430 P.2d 222 (Kan.).
New .Mexico, faced with three different "verification-acknowledgments" affixed to notice of liens declared one of them to be invalid and two of them valid.
See Lyons v. Howard, 117 Pac. 842 (N ..M.), where the
court stated:
''The courts of New .l\Iexico are committed to
the doctrine that the mechanics lien law is remedial in its nature _and equitable in its enforcement and is to be construed liberally. * * * It
also follows in the absence of any statutory requirement as to the form of the verification; that
a substantial compliance therewith is all that is
required.
o particular form of verification is
required by our statute nor is it specifically required thereby that the verification shall be true
as to the knowledge of the affiant, nor is it necessary that there should be an affidavit to the
claim of lien. * * * The verification of a claim of
lien is not for the purpose of proving the lien.
The statement of the lien verified as required by
law and recorded is a mere notice that the claimant intends to avail himself of his right to a lien."
See also Hot Springs Plumbing Co. v. Wallace, 27 P.2d
98-i ( N
where the "verification" reads as follows:
"On this 6th day of August, 1930, before me
personallv appeared J. E. Love, .Manager and
one of th.e partners of said Love Lumber Company, to me known to be the person who executed
the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that
he executed the same as his free act and deed;
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that the name of the owner, the name of the
claimant, the description of the property upon
which the Hen is claimed and the itemized statement hereto attached are correct."
The New Mexico court held the notice of lien to be sufficient, and that any other interpretation would require
a rule of strict construction. The New l\ilexico court in
Home Plumbing Co. v. Pruitt, 372 P.2d 3'78 (N.M.),
does not overrule the Hot Springs Plmnbing case, but,
in fact, refers to it as "the law as thus announced."
Other jurisdictions faced with this problem liberally
construe the mechanic lien statutes and have uphel<l
liens with a variety of technical insufficiencies. See
Georgia Lumber v. Harrison Construction Co., 136 S.E.
399 ('V.Va.) where the notary failed to affix his official
seal to the jurat which was amended in that respect after
the expiration of the time within which the notice was
required to be given. See also Curry v. Morgan, 321 P.
2d 973 (Okla.), where the notary's acknowledgment
was defective and the court held that the defendants
were not unable to determine the lien had been filed and
the nature of the lien by reason of the defect and that
there was substantial complance in the filing of the lien.
See Peterman-Donnell,y Corp. v. First National Bank,
408 P.2d 841, (Ariz.), where the lien notice failed to
satisfy the statutory requirement of a "copy of the contract," and the court validating same held the purpose
of the statute is to give the property owner an opportunity to protect himself and time to investigate the
claim and determine whether it is a proper charge. See
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also Drake Lumber v. Lindquist, 170 P.2d 712 (Ore.),
where the lien was ambiguous as to whether the claim
was by Drake Lumber Company or C. V. Drake as an
individual, and the court held the mechanic's and materailmen's lien law is remedial in nature and should be
liberally construed so as to afford laborers and materialmen the greatest protection compatible with justice and
equity. See Stevenson v. Kilcheken Spruce Mills, Inc.,
412 P .2d 496 (Alaska), where the verification was typed
in the classic manner but not signed by the claimant,
aud the Alaska Court held the lack of the claimant's signature on the lien following the formal oath did not invalidate the lien and that construing the statute as remedial and liberally, the claim of lien is not ineffective
by reason of any insufficiency in the requirement for
verif ica tion.

In Rust v. Kelley Brothers Lumber Co., 21 S.W.
2d, 973 (Ark.), an itemized account attached to the
lien under the Arkansas statute required verification and
the court stated:
"Although the itemized account attached to
the complaint was not sworn to, the amount of
materials furnished and the dates thereof were
established by the evidence of appellee, and were
not attempted to be contradicted. The record
also shows that suit was commenced by appellee
to establish its lien within 90 days after the materials were furnished, but it is insisted that appellee was not entitled to a lien, because it failed
to verifv its account as required by section 6922
of
& Moses' Digest. This does not
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make any difference. This court has uniformh
held that, in an issue between mechanics or mdterialmen and the owner of the property, a substantial compliance with the statute is all that
necessary. The result is that the bringing of 11
suit by the lien claimant against the owner gin
the latter all the notice that could be required as
to the claim for a lien against his property. The
neglect to comply fully with the requirement of
the statute was intended for the protection of
third persons, who might acquire rights in or
liens upon the same property. ]}Iurray v. Rapley, 30 Ark. 568; Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark.
475, 5 S.,V. 799; 1lf.cFadden ·v. Stark, 58 Ark. 7,
22 S."r· 884; Standard Lumber Co. v. TVilson,
173 Ark. 1024, 296 S.\V. 27. In the last case the
court said that the statute was wholly remedial in
its nature, and that, when the controversy is between the holder of the lien and the owner of the
land, an exact compliance with the statute at all
points is not indispensable."
See also, Robertson Lumber Co. v. Swenson, 138
N.W. 684 (No. Da.) where the lien was not verifed and
the court held that it did not affect its validity, and
Patten and Davies Lumber Co. v. Hayden, 298 Pac.
129 (Cal.) wherein the court held that failure to verify
the lien did not forfeit the lien in absence of notice of
the defect or demand for verification.
The Utah Supreme Court, when faced with various
insufficiencies of mechanic's lien notices, has consistently
held the notices to be adequate. At the time of the first
enactment of the territorial statute, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the Utah statute is to be
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, liberally construed. See Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v.
Cullins, 104 U.S. 704, 26 L.ed 704 ( 1881). See Culmer
v. CZif t, 14 Utah 286, 47 Pac. 85, where the description
of the property sought to be charged was erroneous. See
Park Cit.y Meat Co. v. Comstock Mining Co., 36 Utah
145, 103 Pac. 254, involving an erroneous description of
the property where the court states that the lien will not
be defeated by mere technicalities or nice distinction.
See Brnbaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170,
dealing with an erroneous statement of the terms of the
employment contract. See Garner v. Van Patten, 20
Utah 342, 58 Pac. 684, dealing with errors and inconsistencies in the statement of the amount due. And see
/!.,'cries Lumber Co. v. ]}Jartin, 31 Utah 241, 87 Pac. 713,
dealing with a failure to apportion the amounts due with
respect to two contracts. See also Buehner Block v. Gle--:os, supra, where the name of property owner was
omitted.

1

CONCLUSION
Despite a myriad of technical objections raised by
Zions Securities, it effectively authorized and ratified
the architectural services rendered by Harris, which
scrviees actually and constructively benefited Zions' real
property and subjected same to Harris' lien, which lien
has been established in open court to be valid and proper
in all respects, and which entitles Harris to a judgment
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of foreclosure with respect to the admitted indebtedness
the lien secures.
Respectfully Submitted,
DELBERT 1\il. DRAPER JR.
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein
Attorneys for Respondent
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